CMSI Note 26: Easy Infiltration: The Rise of PRC Small Boat Landings on Taiwan

China Maritime Studies Institute – The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) appears to have a doctrine that calls for infiltrating undercover operatives into Taiwan to collect intelligence and to conduct special missions, according to its textbooks. Research shows that cross-Strait small boat landings seem to have begun in 2021, and at least eight Chinese men have been arrested on Taiwan in connection with these cases. Each reported landing occurred at a sensitive location. Five of the eight happened on a known invasion beach. The other three happened at ports and river deltas believed to be of high interest to war planners in the PLA. There are many possible explanations for these landings, such as smuggling, espionage, or human trafficking. Reconnaissance by the PLA, however, cannot be ruled out.

China Maritime Report #60: PLA Naval Aviation Personnel: Training and Career Paths for a Modern Force

China Maritime Studies Institute – PLA Naval Aviation has undergone substantial institutional transformation over the past two decades. This transformation is driven by the goal of becoming a carrier-based force capable of effective joint operations in the maritime domain. This transformation has been accompanied by reforms to pilot education, training, and career management systems, aimed at producing a qualified force capable of conducting long-range maritime operations. Despite significant progress, there are still areas that require improvements, particularly the Naval Aviation University.

China Expands Construction Of Type 071 Amphibious Warfare Ships To Guangzhou

Naval News – China is now undertaking construction of new Type 071 LPD (landing platform dock) at a second location, in addition to existing production at Hudong in Shanghai. Detailed satellite imagery obtained by Naval News shows two additional hulls under construction at the COMEC shipyard (formally CSSC Offshore and Marine Engineering), also known as Guangzhou Shipyard International (GSI), on Longxue Island in Guangzhou.

CMSI Translations #38: Furious Seas, Raging Waves: The PLA’s Development of Sea-to-Shore Strike Capabilities

China Maritime Studies Institute – At present, driven by anxiety and panic over China’s rising power and a desire to contain its peaceful development, U.S. political circles frequently provoke China on core interests related to Taiwan. They have even schemed to exploit “Taiwan Independence” elements to cross a red line regarding forced reunification. Such plots aim to “Ukrainize” Taiwan and drive the island to ruin, thereby raising the cost of reunification for China in order to weaken the country’s national strength and curb its development. Meanwhile, in recent months, “Taiwan Independence” forces on the island, emboldened by the backing of external powers, have acted with increasing brazenness. In response to the repeated actions by U.S. and Taiwan authorities that challenge the bottom line of peace, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army must intensify preparations for military conflict so that, when necessary, it can force a crossing of the Taiwan Strait, launch large-scale amphibious landing operations, completely eliminate the “Taiwan Independence” forces, and achieve the complete reunification of the country.

Second Chinese Uncrewed Submarine Mothership

Covert Shores – Unique naval technologies require unique support vessels. China’s unparalleled uncrewed submarines (XXLUUVs – extra-extra large uncrewed underwater vehicles) now have two special motherships. These vessels feature a unique submarine lift system in the stern which is lowered directly down through a gap in the ships bottom. The second mothership was launched in Guangzhou earlier this month.

China Maritime Report #59: Be Focused, Be Humble, Be Happy: Career Progression, Organization, and Training of PLAN Submariners

China Maritime Studies Institute – Led by the political commissar with the commanding officer serving as deputy, party committees are responsible for major decision-making, maintaining party control, training, and general leadership aboard People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarines. While Chinese sources extoll this collective leadership model, it is unclear how this command structure influences decision-making efficacy in practice.

CMSI Translations #37: The Technical Evolution and Future Development of Chinese Navy’s Third Generation Conventional Submarine

China Maritime Studies Institute – While construction of the Type 039A submarine was underway, the Chinese Navy, guided by anticipated technological developments in future conventional submarines, its own operational requirements, and the potential threats it faced, initiated research/development and improvement efforts for a new generation of submarine technologies. By around 2010, several key technologies and systems required for these new submarines had achieved breakthroughs or completed development, clearing the obstacles for commencing construction of the new Type 039B. At the same time, this marked the beginning of the large‑scale production of the Chinese Navy’s core conventional submarine force for the 2020s.

A Surfacing Strategy: Chinese Unconventional Oceanic Warfare

CIMSEC – This article will analyze these unconventional methods, focusing centrally on China’s evolving systems and strategies, while also drawing parallels to other unconventional strategies of other nations. That said, this article is centrally focused on Chinese maritime strategy evolution and its ramifications. These tools, by examining an undercurrent of strategy applied to different facets of the undersea domain, establish an argument on Beijing’s military-civil infrastructure, through research vessels, cargo fleets, fishing boats, and autonomous drones. In such a way, this infrastructure operates without acting as a clear and present threat or exigency for war; rather, it functions simply as an inconvenience or mild concern, one which becomes increasingly threatening, despite not acting as an obviously military entity

Chinese PLA Navy sends Liaoning carrier group to Western Pacific for training; move shows shift toward ‘far-sea blade’

Global Times – The Chinese PLA Navy sent the Liaoning carrier task group to the Western Pacific on Wednesday for training. This is the Liaoning’s second far-sea training deployment to the Western Pacific this year, which also marks the 10th anniversary of its first such deployment in late December 2016, after the carrier entered service. 

Military experts told the Global Times that the Liaoning’s decade of far-sea operations tells the story of its transformation from a “coastal pathfinder” to a “far-sea blade,” and mirrors the Chinese Navy’s strategic shift from near-sea defense to far-sea defense.

CMSI Note 25: Precluding the Powerful Enemy: A New PLA Concept for a Taiwan Conflict

China Maritime Studies Institute – In recent years, the PLA has employed a new concept—“preclusion” (shezu)—that captures the two related missions of deterring and denying U.S. military intervention in a Taiwan conflict.

In Chinese military strategy, “preclusion” would seek to combine defensive operations on “interior lines” and offensive operations on “exterior lines.” The former would rely on shore based cruise and ballistic missiles “to use the land to control the sea,” while the latter would favor long-range air and naval operations to envelop the approaching enemy.

The “preclusion” concept is essential to PLA thinking on “cognitive warfare,” which seeks, among other aims, to deprive the adversary of the will to intervene on Taiwan’s behalf.

Precluding U.S. military intervention in a Taiwan conflict is an apparent driver of the PLA Navy’s development and employment of carrier strike groups. It is the core focus of PLA Air Force training and operations beyond the First Island Chain.

China Maritime Report #58: Tightening the Institutional Cage: The PLA Navy’s Discipline Inspection Commission

China Maritime Studies Institute – The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) operates a pervasive system of discipline inspection commissions (DICs) spanning the Party and military hierarchy to enforce political discipline and loyalty…The activities of the PLAN DIC and its subordinate DICs may have resulted in a higher degree of professionalism among PLAN personnel, although the magnitude of the change is not clear based on publicly available information. For the PLAN, as well as the rest of the PLA, political loyalty in contemporary China means personal control by and loyalty to Xi Jinping himself.

What Naval Power Cannot Buy

CIMSEC – Ships can deter a competitor, compel a rival, and escort a convoy. What they cannot do is build the institutions, relationships, information systems, and rules that keep maritime order running when the guns are silent. China has worked this out. Washington and most of its partners treat governance as an appendage to naval strategy, rather than a domain of competition in its own right.

CMSI Translations #36: The First Joint Underwater Patrol: Starting with the China-Russia “Joint Sea-2025” Exercise

China Maritime Studies Institute – In August of this year (2025), deep within the waters of the Northwestern Pacific, an underwater patrol was reshaping the strategic landscape of the Asia-Pacific. The Russian submarine Volkhov and the Chinese Navy’s submarine Changcheng 210 came together in a joint formation for the first time, traversing the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea to complete a joint underwater patrol spanning more than 2,000 nautical miles.

China’s Warrior Scientists: Insights from Recent Operations Around Taiwan

War on the Rocks – All states should come to terms with the fact that China’s survey operations east of Taiwan are either a prelude to war or to the slow strangulation of Taiwan’s separate status. China’s fleet of civilian vessels is, in essence, military assets at Beijing’s beck and call, and China increasingly uses its civilian fleet for military purposes, such as containerized missiles and amphibious lift. All states with an interest in peace and stability in East Asia have an interest in deterring China from using its research vessels to engage in military activities such as underwater sabotage, installing or employing fixed undersea sensors, or perhaps prepositioning sea mines. In fact, this applies globally. Beyond East Asia, China’s fleet of research vessels enables Beijing to conduct activities supporting military operations and political objectives anywhere in the world. Unless states recognize and respond to the political, legal, and military impact of their operations, Taiwan’s challenge today may be another country’s tomorrow.