The Strategist – At sea, drones are disruptive, but they are not decisive. They complicate the maritime fight, but they do not replace the enduring strategic logic of sea power.

CIMSEC – Just as oil fueled the mechanized warfare of the 20^th century, electricity is becoming the foundational resource for militaries of the 21^st century. Echoing First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill’s historic decision to switch the Royal Navy from domestic coal to imported oil, today’s energy transition means the ability to generate, store, and deliver electricity will increasingly dictate national power. In order to meet this urgent challenge, the United States government and military must treat grid expansion as a national security priority by creating “Defense Energy Security Zones” to expedite federal permitting, intentionally and aggressively leveraging the Defense Production Act (DPA) to secure critical grid components, and integrating power resilience into how the Pentagon chooses to fund firms that produce munitions and weapon systems.

CIMSEC – The strategic situation, in other words, is not that the United States might defend Taiwan and suffer severe consequences. It is that choosing not to defend Taiwan would impose even greater long-term costs on American power. The preferred outcome remains a peaceful resolution that maintains preservation of Taiwan’s democratic autonomy and the cross-Strait status quo. But a peaceful appeasement that effectively abandons Taiwan to coercive unification would be cataclysmic for America and the entirety of the western world.

The War Zone – The Strait of Hormuz remains an extremely tense waterway and traffic will not be flowing normally through it for some time to come.

War on the Rocks – What might be the most relevant lessons of the fall of Singapore for contemporary U.S. strategists and policymakers as they monitor the growth in might and assertiveness of a new — and arguably even more formidable — revisionist Asian power? Following a brief overview of the Malayan campaign, three critical dimensions of this melancholy chapter will emerge as the most immediately resonant to 21st-century defense planners.

War on the Rocks – Sea control has changed. In recent years, there has been a quiet revolution in maritime strategy that has seen navies increasingly expected to exert greater levels of control over more of the world’s oceans, more of the time. Whether it is NATO forces protecting critical maritime infrastructure in the Baltic, Pacific Island nations requiring maritime domain awareness to protect against illegal fishing, or Chinese coast guard and maritime militia vessels occupying features in the South China Sea, navies across the globe are confronting major challenges and are being forced to operate in new and novel ways. Behind all of this is a change in the value that states place upon the seas. Drawing on work from my recent article in Comparative Strategy, I show how — for many countries — growing areas of the world’s seas and oceans now have considerable economic significance, and value in terms of sovereignty and identity. This newfound value has generated the demand for a new form of sea control, which is radically different from that set out in classical maritime strategy.

USNI News – Iran’s push to charge merchant shippers for passage through the Strait of Hormuz under threat of violence could spread to other parts of the world, maritime experts said this week.

War on the Rocks – On May 4, 2026, a South Korean vessel came under fire in the Strait of Hormuz, leading President Donald Trump to urge the government in Seoul to join the U.S.-led operation to secure the waterway. The South Korean government politely replied it would “review” the American proposal. The event crystallized a major paradox of the ongoing conflict: The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the worst maritime crisis in decades, is fundamentally an Asian problem, yet Asia is almost entirely absent from the debate over how to resolve it.

War on the Rocks – What happens when the Arctic starts to look like the South China Sea?

Council on Geostrategy – On 13th October 2025, the container vessel Istanbul Bridge pulled into Felixstowe, the United Kingdom’s (UK) principal container hub, loaded with nearly 5,000 containers of Chinese goods. On the face of it, the arrival would appear unremarkable; just one among thousands of ships arriving in British ports each year from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Yet, the voyage marked a meaningful shift: rather than following traditional trade lanes, Istanbul Bridge had traversed the Northern Sea Route (NSR). Skirting the Arctic coast of Russia, this is an emerging corridor that promises to change global shipping and trade.

The Strategist – The most dangerous assumption in current contingency planning is that any war, even a regional war in Asia involving the United States, would be short. Four interacting forces would make high-intensity regional conflicts hard to terminate: regime legitimacy pressures, alliance dynamics, operational stalemate and nuclear escalation limits. Together they create a protraction trap. This means that strategies for deterrence should prioritise the ability to sustain and manage a conflict that lasts for many months, at least. The outcome of such a conflict may depend less on who wins the opening battle than on who has greater political, military and economic endurance. One side may seek rapid victory, but the US and its allies should plan to sustain the fight.

CIMSEC – Beyond the specific case of the Houthis and the Red Sea, the analysis points to broader lessons. It underscores the need to improve the efficiency of EU naval operations, particularly in high-intensity contexts, while also highlighting implications for NATO as it prepares to confront the practical challenges of sustaining protracted operations in littoral waters against a well-armed, land-based opponent.

The Guardian – Officials accept that time has run out to pass law after US dropped its support for plan.

CIMSEC – The Strait of Hormuz does not need to be made safe to reopen global shipping. It only needs to be made governable. Even as the United States has begun striking selected Iranian military targets—including recent operations against military facilities on Kharg Island—the fundamental challenge in the Gulf remains unchanged: restoring predictable commercial transit through a contested maritime chokepoint without triggering a broader regional war. Attempts to eliminate every Iranian capability that could threaten shipping would require a prolonged campaign across the Persian Gulf. A more practical approach is to establish a temporary defended transit corridor, concentrating naval escort, airborne surveillance, shipborne helicopter protection, and a limited southern-shore defensive node into a narrow and defensible passage through the strait.

USNI News – The absence of safe passage for merchant vessels through the Straits of Hormuz has led to uncertainty among the shipping industry, Cichen Shen, the Asia Pacific editor with shipping analysis Lloyd’s List, said during a Thursday webinar.

“For the shipping industry and many others, we are still left planning around an open-ended conflict with no visible off road, and that uncertainty is arguably as damaging as the disruption itself,” Shen said.

Breaking Defense – Disruption at the Strait of Hormuz will set off a chain reaction of pressure through the global shipping network, requiring international defense efforts.

RUSI – Iran has closed the Strait of Hormuz without formally closing it. The question facing Washington is not how to secure the waterway – it is whether any realistic military operation actually can.

RUSI – Ripples of economic disruption radiating from the attack on Iran by Israel and the US give notice of the effect a war over Taiwan would spread through the world.

CIMSEC – Over the past five years, numerous articles have called for increased U.S. defense resources focused on the Arctic. This is a strategic mistake, a distraction.

National Interest – James Holmes writes that the 2026 National Defense Strategy sets striking new priorities for the Pentagon—but can hardly be described as “isolationist” in character.

National Interest – James Holmes says that in the late 1890s, naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan made a compelling argument for the United States’ possession of Hawaii. Those interested in the annexation of Greenland might take note.

Australian Naval Institute – Guided by Geoffrey Till’s emphasis on naval balance and freedom of navigation^[i], this essay argues that China’s expanding naval posture near Australia signals a contested transition from Pax Americana to a prospective Pax Sinica. The analysis evaluates the broader implications for Canberra’s alliances, strategic autonomy, and regional security and considered whether these developments represent a natural recalibration of great-power behaviour or a deliberate challenge to Australia’s sovereignty.

The Guardian – The “shadow fleet” used by Russia, Iran and Venezuela to avoid western sanctions and ship cargo to customers including China and India is “exploding” in its scale and scope, and there are concerns that efforts to counter it are drawing closer to dangerous military confrontations.

War on the Rocks – Understanding how Venezuela might respond to U.S. military action requires an accurate assessment of the capabilities, readiness, and doctrinal approach to external intervention of the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana). The country’s government under President Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) adopted that name to honor Simón Bolivar, the 19th-century liberator who fought for South American independence and whose ideals form the basis for modern Venezuelan nationalism, known as Bolivarianism, linking the military to his revolutionary legacy.

National Interest – James Holmes says that the new “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine echoes a similar set of ideas promoted by Teddy Roosevelt a century earlier—but differs in at least three ways.