Rebuilding U.S. Missile Inventory: A Multiyear Project

CSIS – The 39-day bombing and air defense campaign against Iran depleted inventories of key U.S. munitions stockpiles, as a previous CSIS analysis detailed. The United States has enough munitions for any plausible scenario in the Iran war, but the depleted inventories have created a window of vulnerability for a potential Western Pacific conflict. The time needed to rebuild those inventories has thus become a major concern.

The Navy Needs Precise Mass and Here Is How to Get There

War on the Rocks – Investing in medium autonomous warships, lower-cost long-range munitions, and surface drones is not about affordably generating the volume and diversity of effects necessary to survive and fight in a contested environment. The Navy should treat these capabilities not as adjuncts to the existing fleet but as central components of future maritime power.

Maritime Cost Imposition: A New Approach to Great Power War

CIMSEC – The U.S. Navy remains intent on using its high-end platforms for sea denial. To its credit, it is developing the kinds of unmanned systems that are ideally suited for this mission, but only at too slow a pace. To optimize its force structure and accelerate the development of technology, the U.S. Navy should instead commit to a strategy of customized, low-end sea denial coupled with high-end global maritime punishment, and then tailor its doctrine, tactics, and weapons systems to each mission.

Lost in the Small Surface Combatant Wilderness

CIMSEC – The real challenge remains the development of the next-generation surface combatant—a ship with the size, power, and growth margin to accommodate future weapons and sensors. That search has eluded the Navy for decades. The Future Frigate is not that answer. Achieving it will require a clean-sheet design, sustained discipline, and a willingness to align ambition with technical reality. Until then, the frigate program represents not a destination, but a holding action.

A Four Ocean Navy: A Wrong Solution to the Right Problem

CIMSEC – Professor Reveron has identified a genuine strategic problem and proposed a historically grounded solution. His geographic differentiation is the correct starting point for the analysis the nation needs. The problem is that he skips that analysis and proceeds directly to organizational and industrial solutions — giving us the Four-Ocean Navy Act before the strategy that would justify it.