With the Shield Or On It? – Aspides and the EU Aspirations for Sea Control

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CIMSEC – Beyond the specific case of the Houthis and the Red Sea, the analysis points to broader lessons. It underscores the need to improve the efficiency of EU naval operations, particularly in high-intensity contexts, while also highlighting implications for NATO as it prepares to confront the practical challenges of sustaining protracted operations in littoral waters against a well-armed, land-based opponent.

A Temporary Corridor Strategy For Hormuz

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CIMSEC – The Strait of Hormuz does not need to be made safe to reopen global shipping. It only needs to be made governable. Even as the United States has begun striking selected Iranian military targets—including recent operations against military facilities on Kharg Island—the fundamental challenge in the Gulf remains unchanged: restoring predictable commercial transit through a contested maritime chokepoint without triggering a broader regional war. Attempts to eliminate every Iranian capability that could threaten shipping would require a prolonged campaign across the Persian Gulf. A more practical approach is to establish a temporary defended transit corridor, concentrating naval escort, airborne surveillance, shipborne helicopter protection, and a limited southern-shore defensive node into a narrow and defensible passage through the strait.

Navy MQ-4C Triton’s Fate Unknown After Disappearing From Flight Tracking Over Persian Gulf

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The War Zone – U.S. Navy MQ-4C Triton surveillance drone disappeared abruptly and unexpectedly from online flight tracking sites after declaring an in-flight emergency while flying over the Persian Gulf today. The uncrewed aircraft was also tracked rapidly losing altitude right beforehand, prompting widespread questions about its fate. This comes just two days after the United States and Iran agreed to a still very fragile ceasefire, which is heavily contingent on the reopening of the highly strategic Strait of Hormuz.

Iran’s Asymmetric Counterair Campaign: Attacking the U.S. Air Force’s Nests and Eggs

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War on the Rocks – On March 27, Iranian drones and missiles struck Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, destroying an E-3 Sentry, an airborne command center for U.S. operations in the region, and damaging multiple KC-135 tankers. It was not the first strike. Earlier in the month, an Iranian attack had already damaged five KC-135s at the same base. In the history of these aircraft, no enemy had ever achieved such a hit until Iran did both — within two weeks.

Pinning the tail on the Moskva: POPPY and the dawn of satellite ocean surveillance

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The Space Review – In 1963, American reconnaissance satellites overflew a shipyard in Mykolayev, Ukraine, on the Black Sea, and photographed evidence of a new large vessel under construction. But it was not until 1965 that satellite photographs revealed it to be “an unusual ship,” in the words of a CIA report. Later that year, it became clear that it “was a helicopter platform, with either an ASW or amphibious assault mission.” It was launched in 1967 and began sea trial inside Soviet waters. This was a time when the Soviet Union was beginning to send its fleet further out to sea, challenging the US Navy, and any new large warship was of great interest to the Navy admirals.

Iran’s Anti-Access and Area Denial Strategy Is Cruder Than China’s But Still Dangerous

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War on the Rocks – Iran has consciously adapted the operational logic of the Chinese anti-access and area denial strategy to its own resource constraints. It has extended that logic through proxy forces across two of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints — the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb — and constructed a denial architecture that is incomplete by Chinese standards but sufficient for Iran’s strategic purposes. This architecture now operates across three layers: denial of the forward basing infrastructure from which U.S. power projection begins, denial of access through two interlocking maritime chokepoints, and area denial within the Persian Gulf itself. Each layer is imperfect. Together, they compound to a sufficient deterrent.

Closing the Air and Missile Defense Gap in the Indo-Pacific

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War on the Rocks – Sensing vulnerability, the United States and its regional allies and partners are ramping up procurement of air and missile defense assets, though progress is likely to be constrained by competing spending priorities and already overstretched defense industrial bases. These constraints underscore the need for complementary approaches that can deliver near-term gains without relying solely on expanded procurement. Networking missile sensors and interceptors across the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies and partners is one such approach. Coalition air and missile defense can generate operational efficiencies in sensing and interception that have the potential to shrink Chinese air and missile advantages. While compelling in theory, is it feasible in practice? Can the United States and its allies and partners navigate the challenging geography and politics of the Indo-Pacific to counter Chinese air and missile advantages through coordinated air and missile defense?