U.S. Navy orders $123M more Lionfish underwater drones

Defence Blog – The U.S. Navy has ordered another $123.4 million worth of Lionfish small underwater drones.

Lionfish is the U.S. Navy’s name for HII’s REMUS 300, a torpedo-shaped autonomous vehicle that two people can carry and launch. HII says the design can dive to 305 meters (1,000 feet) and run missions of up to 30 hours, and that it supports mine countermeasures, intelligence and surveillance, anti-submarine warfare and electronic warfare. Its modular body is built to take different sensor payloads, and it replaces the Mk 18 Mod 1 Swordfish, an older vehicle based on HII’s smaller REMUS 100.

(Thanks to Alain)

Exercise Strike Warrior 2026 puts NATO firepower behind UK Commandos

Navy Lookout – More than 2,000 personnel are taking part in UK-led NATO Exercise Strike Warrior 2026. Although Royal Navy warship participation has been minimal, the exercise has seen significant Royal Marine activity, including commandos deploying from a German submarine, directing naval gunfire and conducting amphibious, reconnaissance and strike missions.

Towards a JEF naval ecosystem: A blueprint for British leadership in the High North

Council on Geostrategy – The Joint Expeditionary Force provides the UK with essential tactical mass and geographical access to the Wider North, although its members remain reliant upon high-end British sovereign capabilities. By transforming the grouping into a fully fledged regional vanguard for defence, Britain can ensure that adversaries are deterred and allies are reassured as the Wider North becomes ever more significant in an era of growing geopolitical competition.

Mounting concern in Australia over UK ability to deliver SSN-AUKUS

Navy Lookout – In this guest article, Rear Admiral Peter Briggs, RAN (Rtd), articulates the worries held by some amongst the defence establishment in Australia about the promises the UK has made on submarine delivery. Some consider statements emanating from the UK Defence Nuclear Enterprise to be public relations rhetoric that do not reflect the true state of the enterprise.

What America Must Change to Make Korean Shipbuilding Matter

CIMSEC – If Korean involvement leaves American yards more productive, the supplier base deeper, workload more predictable, and the Navy more capable of converting requirements into ships, the Korea-U.S. Shipbuilding Partnership Initiative will have mattered. If not, it will have become another sophisticated policy framework that correctly diagnosed the crisis while leaving the institutional pathologies that created it largely untouched.

UK plans 50% increase in military sealift capacity as ageing ships near replacement

Navy Lookout – The Point-class ro-ro MV Eddystone has completed an eight-week refit in Denmark, the first of four planned for the ships that carry the UK’s heavy military equipment worldwide. The work is intended to keep the class running to 2031 while the Defence Investment Plan (DIP) lays the ground for a larger successor fleet.

Why Modern Navies Still Need a Mine Countermeasures Force in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

CIMSEC – Throughout naval history, few weapons have demonstrated the strategic endurance of the naval mine. Despite successive advances in military technology, it remains a highly effective instrument of sea denial, enabling even conventionally inferior actors to constrain the freedom of maneuver of technologically superior fleets and disrupt critical maritime lines of communication.

China Maritime Report #58: Tightening the Institutional Cage: The PLA Navy’s Discipline Inspection Commission

China Maritime Studies Institute – The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) operates a pervasive system of discipline inspection commissions (DICs) spanning the Party and military hierarchy to enforce political discipline and loyalty…The activities of the PLAN DIC and its subordinate DICs may have resulted in a higher degree of professionalism among PLAN personnel, although the magnitude of the change is not clear based on publicly available information. For the PLAN, as well as the rest of the PLA, political loyalty in contemporary China means personal control by and loyalty to Xi Jinping himself.