China Maritime Report #61: Educating a Modern Maritime Force: Reforms to Naval Education in China

China Maritime Studies Institute – In the Xi Jinping era, the Chinese military has intensified efforts to improve the training and education of military officers to remedy perceived leadership deficiencies. Shortly after taking office, Xi called on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to grasp the “central task” (中心任务) of training high-quality military talents.

How the Army Fights (a Maritime War in the Pacific)

Modern War Institute – The Army has new operational warfighting guidance. General Christopher LaNeve’s How the Army Fights organizes landpower around four interdependent elements that enable operational maneuver: convergence, strike, close battle, and endurance. Although principally concerned with how expeditionary landpower can achieve strategic objectives, this framework has profound implications for maritime campaigns. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the contested zones of the northwestern Pacific, where the US military and its allies face an adversary capable of contesting American access through integrated missile networks, maritime surveillance, electronic warfare, amphibious assault, and increasingly sophisticated networks of unmanned systems. For the Army, this will require employing landpower to increasingly enable naval freedom of action while denying adversary aggression. In that context, the Army’s ability to seize and control terrain, employ fires across domains, integrate multidomain effects, and sustain distributed operations can transform archipelago and littoral networks into fortified positions of operational advantage.

Japan’s Most Dangerous Military Constraint Is Time

War on the Rocks – In a Taiwan contingency where U.S. forces need to operate from the Sakishimas, Japanese reinforcements will first need to deploy to the islands, secure access off base, and disperse beyond their small garrisons to make room for U.S. forces. These preparations should occur weeks before the cabinet even considers recognizing an armed attack situation, all against the backdrop of crisis management, civil protection, evacuation, and potential refugee flows. Published estimates of a peacetime II 4(b) process range from three months to more than five (timelines U.S. planners in Japan consider optimistic). Without procedural flexibility, the alliance risks falling behind early in a decision sequence that is much longer than often imagined, potentially leaving policymakers with fewer, more disruptive, or more escalatory decisions.

Royal Navy announces initial Atlantic Net agreement

Navy Lookout – The MoD confirmed that it has signed an agreement with Southampton-based Ocean Infinity Solutions to establish a North Atlantic surveillance network for tracking Russian submarines and helping protect undersea cables. The RN has also contracted Saab to integrate lightweight Giraffe drone-detection radars into its fleet of uncrewed vessels.

Royal Navy bets on development speed as Hybrid Navy adds mass but increases risks

Navy Lookout – The commissioning of the Royal Navy’s First Autonomous Squadron and the showcase of a new Capability Accelerator Hub in Portsmouth mark a deliberate attempt to field equipment in weeks rather than years. Senior officers speaking at the launch set out a strong case for cheap uncrewed mass, but were also honest about the risks of moving this fast and the personnel pressures behind the new squadron.

Who Repairs the Internet in Wartime?

War on the Rocks – Wartime submarine cable repair should be treated as a national security mission and funded as such. The designation of submarine cables as critical infrastructure, the establishment of a federal coordinating authority with emergency powers to prioritize repairs, and an increased budget to expand the Cable Security Fleet would give the United States a way to decide which cables are repaired first and which ships are needed to carry out those decisions.

CMSI Note 26: Easy Infiltration: The Rise of PRC Small Boat Landings on Taiwan

China Maritime Studies Institute – The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) appears to have a doctrine that calls for infiltrating undercover operatives into Taiwan to collect intelligence and to conduct special missions, according to its textbooks. Research shows that cross-Strait small boat landings seem to have begun in 2021, and at least eight Chinese men have been arrested on Taiwan in connection with these cases. Each reported landing occurred at a sensitive location. Five of the eight happened on a known invasion beach. The other three happened at ports and river deltas believed to be of high interest to war planners in the PLA. There are many possible explanations for these landings, such as smuggling, espionage, or human trafficking. Reconnaissance by the PLA, however, cannot be ruled out.

China Maritime Report #60: PLA Naval Aviation Personnel: Training and Career Paths for a Modern Force

China Maritime Studies Institute – PLA Naval Aviation has undergone substantial institutional transformation over the past two decades. This transformation is driven by the goal of becoming a carrier-based force capable of effective joint operations in the maritime domain. This transformation has been accompanied by reforms to pilot education, training, and career management systems, aimed at producing a qualified force capable of conducting long-range maritime operations. Despite significant progress, there are still areas that require improvements, particularly the Naval Aviation University.

On American destroyers, avoid a self-inflicted wound in Spain

Defense News – Consider the case of the Trump administration’s ongoing review of U.S. force posture in Europe and whether Washington will maintain a handful of American naval destroyers forward-stationed in Rota, Spain. Stationing destroyers at Rota helps secure vital American interests in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East and allows the ships to spend more time conducting missions than traversing back and forth across the Atlantic.