Pinning the tail on the Moskva: POPPY and the dawn of satellite ocean surveillance

Posted on by

The Space Review – In 1963, American reconnaissance satellites overflew a shipyard in Mykolayev, Ukraine, on the Black Sea, and photographed evidence of a new large vessel under construction. But it was not until 1965 that satellite photographs revealed it to be “an unusual ship,” in the words of a CIA report. Later that year, it became clear that it “was a helicopter platform, with either an ASW or amphibious assault mission.” It was launched in 1967 and began sea trial inside Soviet waters. This was a time when the Soviet Union was beginning to send its fleet further out to sea, challenging the US Navy, and any new large warship was of great interest to the Navy admirals.

Iran’s Anti-Access and Area Denial Strategy Is Cruder Than China’s But Still Dangerous

Posted on by

War on the Rocks – Iran has consciously adapted the operational logic of the Chinese anti-access and area denial strategy to its own resource constraints. It has extended that logic through proxy forces across two of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints — the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb — and constructed a denial architecture that is incomplete by Chinese standards but sufficient for Iran’s strategic purposes. This architecture now operates across three layers: denial of the forward basing infrastructure from which U.S. power projection begins, denial of access through two interlocking maritime chokepoints, and area denial within the Persian Gulf itself. Each layer is imperfect. Together, they compound to a sufficient deterrent.

Closing the Air and Missile Defense Gap in the Indo-Pacific

Posted on by

War on the Rocks – Sensing vulnerability, the United States and its regional allies and partners are ramping up procurement of air and missile defense assets, though progress is likely to be constrained by competing spending priorities and already overstretched defense industrial bases. These constraints underscore the need for complementary approaches that can deliver near-term gains without relying solely on expanded procurement. Networking missile sensors and interceptors across the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies and partners is one such approach. Coalition air and missile defense can generate operational efficiencies in sensing and interception that have the potential to shrink Chinese air and missile advantages. While compelling in theory, is it feasible in practice? Can the United States and its allies and partners navigate the challenging geography and politics of the Indo-Pacific to counter Chinese air and missile advantages through coordinated air and missile defense?

Shipping Industry Uncertain As Hormuz Crisis Carries On

Posted on by

USNI News – The absence of safe passage for merchant vessels through the Straits of Hormuz has led to uncertainty among the shipping industry, Cichen Shen, the Asia Pacific editor with shipping analysis Lloyd’s List, said during a Thursday webinar.

“For the shipping industry and many others, we are still left planning around an open-ended conflict with no visible off road, and that uncertainty is arguably as damaging as the disruption itself,” Shen said.

Defending Global Order Against China’s Maritime Insurgency – Part 2

Posted on by

CIMSEC – Part 2 of an interview with Hunter Stires. Hunter Stires, who served as the Maritime Strategist to the Secretary of the Navy during the tenure of Secretary Carlos Del Toro, views each of these challenges as interconnected parts of a global struggle for the Freedom of the Sea and the international order, with the central front in the South China Sea. Stires believes the future of global order rests on the extent to which China succeeds in claiming ownership to one of the world’s most important waterways and disrupting the centuries-old concept of the freedom of the seas upon which the modern global order was founded. Stires helped found the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Counterinsurgency (COIN) Project to better conceptualize and combat China’s battle to overturn the international order at sea. This interview captures Stires’ thoughts on the history of the Maritime COIN project and its ongoing relevance for intensifying strategic competition between the US and China.

Asymmetry Rising – How Autonomous Systems Enforce Sea Denial on High Value Targets

Posted on by

CIMSEC – High-value naval platforms carry significance far beyond their military utility. They are symbols of national prestige, and damage to them carries political consequences even when losses are limited. By contrast, unmanned systems carry little political risk. Losing an autonomous platform does not provoke domestic backlash or escalation pressure.

As competition intensifies in regions such as the Indian Ocean, the balance of advantage may increasingly Favor those who can impose denial rather than project dominance. The decisive question is shifting away from who fields the most impressive platforms, and toward who can most effectively deny the use of contested maritime spaces. In that environment, low-cost autonomous systems are not force multipliers; they are force limiters, capable of eroding the operational freedom of even the most advanced navies.

Hedge With Non-Kinetic Defense

Posted on by

CIMSEC – The Navy needs hedge strategies that keep the force relevant in high‑end conflict without breaking the bank in peacetime—ways to augment the general purpose force and cover the most dangerous scenarios, which specifically includes a potential war with China. Layered non-kinetic defenses—employed as a combined system—offer one such hedge. For surface forces, the Navy should update the PCMS program with a new tile‑and‑paint system and pair it with radar reflectors that distort imaging seekers. For air forces, it should field decoys and radar reflectors, as seen in Ukraine, to cast doubt on the precise location of U.S. air assets. Finally, the Navy and joint force should combine small, mobile jammers and dazzlers to saturate adversary ISR and degrade battle damage assessment, preserving operational surprise.

Chinese official media reveals new details on Type 054B frigate as AI algorithms nearly eliminate air defense blind spots

Posted on by

Global Times – An official media report on Sunday disclosed multiple new developments regarding the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s Type 054B guided-missile frigate Qinzhou. The report highlighted one of its most distinctive features: a next-generation architecture powered by advanced AI algorithms, enabling near-zero blind spots in air defense. Experts say the Type 054B represents a major leap in integrated combat capability and positions the vessel among the most advanced frigates in service today.